A Sign of the Times. The Political Culture of Gambling in the Netherlands

Kingma, S.F.

published in
Gambling Cultures. Studies in History and Interpretation
1996

CULTURE: POLICIES AND POLITICS
Series editors: Tony Bennett, Jennifer Craik, Ian Hunter, Colin Mercer and Dugald Williamson

What are the relations between cultural policies and cultural politics? Too often, none at all. In the history of cultural studies so far, there has been no shortage of discussion of cultural politics. Only rarely, however, have such discussions taken account of the policy instruments through which cultural activities and institutions are funded and regulated in the mundane politics of bureaucratic and corporate life. *Culture: Policies and Politics* addresses this imbalance. The books in this series interrogate the role of culture in the organization of social relations of power, including those of class, nation, ethnicity and gender. They also explore the ways in which political agendas in these areas are related to, and shaped by, policy processes and outcomes. In its commitment to the need for a fuller and clearer policy calculus in the cultural sphere, *Culture: Policies and Politics* aims to promote a significant transformation in the political ambit and orientation of cultural studies and related fields.

ROCK AND POPULAR MUSIC:
politics, policies, institutions
Edited by: Tony Bennett, Simon Frith, Lawrence Grossberg, John Shepherd, Graeme Turner

BIRTH OF THE MUSEUM:
History, Theory, Politics
Tony Bennett

FILM POLICY
Edited by: Albert Moran

GAMBLING CULTURES

Studies in history and interpretation

Edited by Jan McMillen

London and New York

ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

TABLES

Dombrink, J. and Thompson, W. (1990) *The Last Resort: Success and Failure in Campaigns for Casinos*, Reno: University of Nevada Press.
Downes, D. M., Davies, B. P., David, M. E. and Stones, P. (1976) *Gambling, Work and Leisure: A Study Across Three Areas*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Eadington, W. (1982) 'The evolution of corporate gambling in Nevada', *Nevada Review of Business and Economics* 6(1): 13–22.
Findlay, J. (1986) *People of Chance*, New York: Oxford University Press.
Focus (1984) 'Marketing studies, teamwork help make L G & K big lottery winner', *Focus* (25 Jan.): 24–6.
Haller, M. (1979) 'The changing structure of American gambling in the twentieth century', *Journal of Social Issues* 35(3): 87–114.
Hofstadter, R., Miller, W. and Aaron, D. (1957) *The United States: The History of a Republic*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Le Fleur, I. (1984) 'The VLT phenomenon', *Gaming Business Magazine* (June): 11–12.
Lowy, M. (1991) *High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle*, New York: Praeger.
Mahon, G. (1980) *The Company that Bought the Boardwalk: A Reporter's Story of How Resorts International Came to Atlantic City*, New York: Random House.
Martinez, T. (1983) *The Gambling Scene: Why People Gamble*, Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
O'Connor, J. (1973) *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, New York: St Martin's Press.
Offe, C. (1972) 'Political authorities and class structures: an analysis of late capitalist societies', *International Journal of Sociology* 2: 73–108.
Reuter, P. and Rubenstein, J. (1978) 'Fact, fancy and organized crime', *The Public Interest* 53: 45–67.
Skolnick, J. (1978) *House of Cards: Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling*, Boston: Little, Brown.
Smith, G. (1992) 'Sucker bet or sure thing: a critical analysis of sports lotteries', *Journal of Gambling Studies* 8(4): 331–50.
Spiro, M. (1974) 'On the tax incidence of the Pennsylvania lottery', *National Tax Journal* 23(1): 74–82.
Steffens, L. ([1904] 1948) *The Shame of the Cities*, New York: Peter Smith.
Weber, M. (1930) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Scribner.

11

A SIGN OF THE TIMES

The political culture of gaming in the Netherlands

Sytze Kingma[1]

> The *Staats Loterij* Fever is raging. Raging, indeed; for everybody is buying, everybody is hoping and fearing, everybody is pretty sure to win. . . . I am told the ruin begotten of this among these classes (servants, small traders, little boys), especially, is more than a stranger can conceive; and that the purloining of the master's silver is but the inevitable consequence when the servant takes to purchasing in the *Staats Loterij*. . . . It is not so difficult to name the winner. For the Royal State Lottery wins, and draws a snug little income from the odious traffic; draws it from the idleness, sin, crime, and want of its own children.
>
> (Dickens 1858: 156)

Charles Dickens lamented the flourishing trade in lottery tickets in nineteenth-century Amsterdam. The Dutch upper class also expressed their concern about the gaming habits of ordinary citizens and advocated the discontinuance of the state lottery. Gaming in various forms had long before then found fertile soil in the prosperous Low Countries, which had been shaped by both mercantile capitalism and Calvinistic morality. The tension between a religious attitude to life and a capitalistic existence characterised the cultural climate and cultural politics of the time, dominated by affluent burghers.

In his study of the Golden Age – the seventeenth century, when the Dutch Republic of the Seven United Provinces was a leading country in the capitalist world – Schama (1987) provides an extensive treatment of the preoccupation with money, from which a picture emerges of widespread involvement in speculation and lotteries, and in particular the regulations and ambivalent attitudes that went with it. Financial gain, commercial interests, charity, conviviality and entertainment provided an inextricable knot of motives and controversies. In a remarkable way, these factors came together in speculation on tulips, culminating in 1636 in an hysterical frenzy – trade had degenerated into unbridled gambling. The boundaries between unsystematic gambling and organised stock-market trade were rather vague at the time.

The burghers also indulged in exclusive lotteries. These were characteristic of the Dutch Republic, and combined worldly greed with religious causes. These lotteries provided the rich both with an opportunity to win scarce and precious goods, especially prizes of silver, and a means of engaging in cultural politics as well as entertainment. Many churches, almshouses, hospices and other charitable institutions had the lotteries to thank for their foundation, their buildings or extensions. Enterprises such as these provided assistance in times of regional or local disasters, and lotteries were organised in order to raise funds for urban prestige projects and for wars.

> These were the good times of Dutch lotteries, instigated by sobriety and charitable causes, where those who participated were not driven primarily or solely by pecuniary gain, but by the furtherance of a cause both beneficial and agreeable in the eyes of God.
>
> (Fokker 1862: 62)[2]

But Fokker himself overemphasised the moral motives for participating in earlier lotteries and was unremitting in providing arguments for the discontinuance of the state lottery. It is significant that one of his reasons for considering the state lottery to be harmful was that towards the end of the eighteenth century it had become more and more geared to the participation of the working class. In the eyes of Fokker, this meant 'speculation on the lusts and passions of an unthinking multitude, which is in no way able to resist temptation' (Fokker 1864: 26).

During the nineteenth century the upper class changed from initiators, organisers and participants to opponents of lotteries. In a precursor of the modern welfare state, social welfare, which previously had been the responsibility of private initiative and charities (including gaming), to a greater extent became organised collectively and a generalised tax was introduced to guarantee continuity of income. With the industrialisation of the Netherlands, dignitaries foresaw the rise of a vast and potentially dangerous army of wage labourers, as had already occurred in England (de Swaan 1988). But before they embarked upon the civilising activities of the nineteenth century – aimed at factory discipline and stimulating regular life in working-class families through a campaign against, among other things, alcohol, prostitution and gambling – the upper class, who strongly adhered to the Protestant work ethic, first deprived themselves of these pleasures. With their interest in lotteries the emerging bourgeoisie had ironically been at the basis of Dutch organised gaming. In France and Germany, this role was played by an aristocratic elite (relatively absent in the Netherlands) who indulged in less instrumental and more exclusive forms of casino gaming. In the Netherlands, casino gaming was introduced much later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the seaside resort of Scheveningen (Figure 11.1) and led an irregular and illegal existence until well into the 1970s.

The history of gaming in the Netherlands can be regarded as a three-phase development. The first phase was the period of mercantile capitalism and early state formation of a Protestant federalistic state from the Middle Ages to 1813.

Figure 11.1 Distribution of casinos in the Netherlands, 1990

Gaming had a strong commercial function, as far as lotteries were concerned – other gambling was organised in an undifferentiated manner and was mainly regulated to ensure public order – even though this function was hardly distinguishable from political and social objectives and objectives related to entertainment. This period saw the rise of organised lotteries, with the introduction of the state lottery in 1726, which marked the establishment of centralised government authority. The second phase took shape during the nineteenth century, when gaming gradually became embedded in industrial capitalism and a democratic state. A systematic fight against and the regulation of all publicly organised gaming from a moral point of view was initiated in this period. Gaming came to be valued negatively in cultural terms. This phase lasted until the Second World War. The third phase is the development of a permissive gaming culture in the welfare state, tightly interwoven within an international context. After the Second World War, a slow development set in towards the legalisation, liberalisation and differentiation of gaming. Cultural functions remained dominant in gaming, which came to be valued positively as entertainment and which increasingly was exploited commercially.

This chapter offers a historical-sociological analysis of the modern gaming sector in the Netherlands, which will be related to its socio-cultural, political and economic contexts. On a general level, gaming will be perceived from three perspectives: it will be related to processes of state formation and civilising, of

economy formation and commercialisation, and of class formation and emancipation.[3] First, the chapter will examine the subjection of gaming to state control and its separation as a 'cultural sector' in the first half of the twentieth century. Then it will consider the remarkable expansion, legitimation and commercialisation of gaming within its 'postmodern' context.

GAMING CONTROL

The modernisation of the Netherlands in the second half of the nineteenth century brought about a new policy concerning gaming, a policy which was targeted neither at *laissez-faire* nor at a total ban. This was characterised by a formal standardisation of gaming and by controlling market forces through state regulation. Gaming was shaped by changing forces of incriminating morality and economic gain, of state government and local autonomy, of collective action and everyday life, as a result of which restrictions varied between games and between severe or lenient sanctions.

Initially, Liberals were in the majority in the parliamentary democracy which they founded after 1848 (Holthoon 1985; Stuurman 1983). They did not consider gaming itself to be irrational, although they considered gambling economically unproductive, a waste of money and time, but were more concerned with possible abuses in exploitation and the potentially harmful consequences for players and their families. They considered it to be government's responsibility primarily to channel the community's passion for gaming. These principles were the foundation for the first Dutch gaming legislation, the State Lottery Act of 1885. Lottery tickets were to be sold for fixed prices; there would be three draws per year and a restricted number of tickets available.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Liberals lost their power to the Confessionals (Protestants and Catholics), who were widely supported by the *petit bourgeoisie*, the lower middle classes. They used to their advantage the democratising system based on party politics. Their policies were guided by fundamental Protestant principles. The Confessionals held the opinion that the state had a God-given responsibility for the morality of citizens. They condemned gaming as immoral and wanted to go much further in the fight against gaming than the Liberals. But they had to admit that gaming as it existed could not be reversed in an instant. Politically, they had to retain the support of gamblers. They also recognised that it was impossible to ban gaming because it was widely accepted as an intrinsic aspect of human nature.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Confessionals formed the basis for a policy of standardising game norms, which was aimed at: distinguishing between 'dangerous' and 'innocent' games; restricting commercial exploitation; and restraining motives of personal gain in the players. Lotteries remained legal in the Lottery Act of 1905 but were subjected to stringent conditions. In 1911 'games of hazard' in gambling houses and on racecourses, which were considered to be socially dangerous, were banned completely by an extension of penal statute

(van Poelje *et al.* 1962). Where gaming was still permitted, cash prizes were prohibited, with the exception of the state lottery. In addition, private commercial exploitation of gaming was prohibited. Gaming proceeds were to be donated to charitable causes or to public welfare. In comparison with earlier policies, however, the functional relation of gaming with public welfare and charity had been reversed. Charity and public welfare were seen as strategies for restraining the interests of operators and the motive to play, instead of the main reasons for organised gaming.

Although the government never totally succeeded in controlling gaming by law, the fight against gaming remained the prime objective in government policy until the Second World War. Gaming was primarily judged on the basis of culture and morality, with a negative perception of the industry. Shortly after the war, this objective met with opposition as a result of changing political circumstances and developments in the field of sports.

With a view to the interests of trotting and racing, which had declined as a result of the prohibition of the totalisator in 1911, a totalisator for horse-racing was established in 1948. In 1957, the Dutch Football Association (KNVB) for the first time organised a national football pool, which became an issue in the 1959 elections.[4] Possibilities for the state lottery were extended because it could not meet the demand (*Nederlandse Staatswetten* 1964). Also, gaming machinery was imported from the United States, further expanding the gaming market.

In politics the Socialists gained power. In the 1920s and 1930s, as did the Protestants and Catholics, they formed a social and cultural 'pillar' organised around collaborative networks of socialistic political, educational, charitable and recreational institutions (Therborn 1989).[5] Conditions were set for a political culture of prudence, sobriety, discussion and compromise which resulted in administrative alliances with a wide social basis, and in the organisation of socio-economic interests in corporatist bodies. The state assigned itself a new and leading role. Fordist-Keynesian policies were implemented, aimed at sustained economic growth, full employment, the control of inflation and assuring effective consumer demand.

Cooperation between political groups, however, did not lead to the erosion of the system of pillarisation; on the contrary, all groups fortified their own positions. As regards gaming, this meant repeated and lively ideological debates in Parliament. Catholics and Socialists were less strongly opposed to the legalisation of gaming than Protestants, although they also had some objections. The Gaming Act of 1964 was a product of this political culture. This law was aimed at combining diverse regulations pertaining to various games, bridging the gap between moral objections and pragmatic arguments, and narrowing the gulf between legal opportunities and actual gaming practices as they had developed. Gaming remained illegal, unless the government made an exception, although the legal basis for approved gaming was marginally extended. All lotteries were now allowed to pay out cash prizes, and finally the sports totalisator was legalised with the National Sports Totalisator (SNS) as its operator.[6] Commercial and private exploitation of gaming, including casinos, remained a political taboo.

Table 11.1 Consumer expenditures on legal gambling (million guilders)

	1955	*1965*	*1975*	*1985*	*1990*
Slot machines	–	–	–	–	1,448
Holland Casinos	–	–	–	142	435
Bank lottery	–	–	41	80	86
Sports totalisator	–	21	114	92	84
Racing/trotting	3	8	24	21	*
State lottery	9	15	157	177	207
Totals	12	44	336	512	2,260

Source: Compiled from various reports

*Information not available

As is often the case in restrictive legislation, gaming law lagged behind social developments. By the time the Gaming Act was enacted, the effectiveness of pillarisation was past its peak and a new era had begun. The 1960s brought more leisure, prosperity and commercial entertainment for Dutch citizens, together with secularisation, democratisation (on the level of social institutions), liberalisation and social emancipation. The working classes experienced a steady rise in material living standards, especially after a wage explosion in 1963. Adolescents developed self-conscious consumerist lifestyles. Students, intellectuals and feminists led a movement for social emancipation, in which the breaking of hierarchic structures of authority and sexuality were major themes. The work ethic was challenged. In social relations the focus shifted from authority to spontaneous solidarity, resulting in an emphasis on self-control rather than on 'control from above' (Kapteyn 1980; Wouters 1990). These changes were reflected in relations between employers and employees, the police and the public, medical attendants and patients, men and women, parents and children.

In politics as well, opposition between the progressive modernists and the conservative traditionalists intensified. An ideological shift took place in all philosophical schools of thought. With increasing difficulty, a coalition of three Confessional parties managed to hold a small majority until in 1980 they merged into one Christian Democratic Party (CDA).[7] On all fronts, parties took up new positions on the left–right polarity, with a general trend to liberalisation. Society became more permissive, and attitudes changed towards gaming in politics as well as in public opinion.

Between 1965 and 1975 the state lottery and the sports and horse-racing totalisators realised unprecedented growth. This can be attributed to wide community acceptance, increases in the number of draws and maximum prizes, and rising material living standards (Table 11.1). Significantly, public opinion shifted on the legalisation of roulette. In 1948, only 19 per cent of the adult population

was in favour of legalisation; in 1965, 31 per cent, and in 1971, a slight majority of 52 per cent favoured legalisation.[8]

A PERMISSIVE GAMING CULTURE

In 1974 the Gaming Act was amended to liberalise and democratise gaming further. The bill acknowledged the interests of socio-cultural institutions as well as the interests of players. In the assessment of the impact of gaming, the emphasis shifted to a more positive focus on the entertainment value of the game, rather than a negative view of gambling motives. In addition to this, players were considered to be increasingly responsible for their own behaviour. In comparison with debates in Parliament in the preceding period, the treatment of the bill was surprisingly pragmatic. A number of speakers did their best to distinguish ethical arguments from practical, regulatory issues, and orthodox Protestants and some Socialists firmly adhered to their former stance. Although gaming was still morally disputed, the bill passed with a small majority.

The possibilities for existing legal games were extended further, introducing a range of casino games, lotto and *kienen* (a form of bingo) for charity. In addition to the redefinition of legal gaming, competition from abroad became a legitimising factor. In this respect, the trek of Dutch players to Belgian casinos and the participation of Dutch players in German lotteries were influential. Legalisation was also expressly proposed as a means of controlling illegal gaming. Of greater importance were arguments concerning the commercial interests of the culture industry attached to gaming. Casinos were advocated to improve tourist infrastructure. Interest in lotto was primarily associated with sports interests, and the General Dutch Lottery (ALN/SUFA) had been active for some time with lotteries for charity, welfare institutions and public health.[9]

Although there was a clearly identifiable trend towards the legalisation of gaming practices, gaming still remained controversial and subject to state restrictions. For casinos, the principle of a single licensee, a state-controlled monopoly, was applied. Lotto was administered by the sports totalisator. With respect to minor games of chance such as *kienen*, the stakes were to remain low and a large portion of the proceeds, 60 per cent, had to go to local socio-cultural groups such as clubs and societies.

Legalisation and liberalisation of gaming is one major theme in the political culture of gaming. From a sociological point of view, the subjection to state control and subsequent institutionalisation of formal gaming norms can be understood as a process of 'autonomisation': the time-spatial separation of a cultural sector with a regulation regime of its own.[10] The integration, definition and classification of the various elements within the gaming sector occurred simultaneously and is a second major theme in the political culture of gaming. Different standards for the various games, which were interrelated methodically and with increasing precision (Figure 11.2), can be attributed to technical differences between the games. However, no less important are their respective



Figure 11.2 Gaming legislation in the Netherlands

influences: the specific periods and contexts in which the games developed, their socio-cultural basis and the political and economic power they have been able to generate. In the process, mechanisms of repression, liberalisation and legalisation are simultaneously reproduced within the gaming sector.

With legalisation, the general pattern of integration/differentiation for each game follows more or less the same logic of development, while the dynamics of development differ considerably for each game. Typically, games develop at local levels in response to pressure from the market, then the market grows and

interest groups become dependent upon the game, which results in increasing competition, conflicts and 'moral panics'. This produces a need for centralisation and state control. Initially, the state's aim is repression. If this fails, controlled legalisation follows.

This general process can be discerned in the development of Dutch lotteries and the Sports Totalisator. Similar processes occurred in the cases of bingo, slot machines and casino games, which experienced accelerated growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Together with their integration in a unifying regime of regulation, the distinctive features of these games were carefully defined *vis-à-vis* each other, if the process of legalisation not only distinguished between legal game forms, but also led to new and sharp distinctions between legal and illegal gaming. Legality and illegality were defined in one and the same process – the one cannot be understood without the other.

Kienen, bingo and slot machines

Kienen is a traditional numbers game in Belgium and the southern provinces, the Catholic region of the Netherlands, where the game experienced a revival during the 1950s (Kingma 1988, 1991). Informal clubs discovered the game as a source of income and it suited the preferences of working-class women, who were badly represented on the entertainment market. The game was illegal, however, subject to the ban on games of 'hazard'. Nevertheless, it was played on an increasing scale in public places such as parish halls, club houses, community centres and pubs. Despite its illegality, it was considered by local and regional authorities to be an innocent form of public entertainment. However, in the early 1970s firm action was undertaken against *kienen*, because the game was more frequently and openly played for money, and because it was being exploited by semi-professional *kien*-masters and pub owners. This period of repression preceded legalisation of *kienen* in 1974, in which public games were permitted but commercial exploitation was banned.

The police and the judiciary failed in their resolve to end commercialised *kienen*. A weakened form of semi-commercial operation was condoned because the law was hard to enforce, and breaches were seen as insignificant or were successfully concealed. There was considerable variation between local authorities in levels of acceptance and regulation, which resulted in a remarkable mobility among women players: *kien* and (later) bingo trips were organised to bingo venues in municipalities with the most lenient prescriptions. Gaming disturbances broke out everywhere the game appeared, not only in the southern provinces, usually as a result of competition between operators and police intervention. Local policies gradually became more standardised.

In the 1970s, the international game of bingo, which closely resembles *kienen*, appeared in the west of the country and was soon found all over the Netherlands. In the early 1980s the first bingo halls were established in former cinemas, following the British example. Here too, in 1989, after years of opportunistic

tolerance, commercial practices were restricted partly as a result of conflicts between operators.

The development of the slot-machine market in the same period was somewhat similar to the development of *kienen* and bingo. However, in the case of slot machines, commercial operation was finally legalised. As early as the 1930s, people were experimenting with coin machines. By the 1950s, these machines were a familiar sight all over the country. One or two companies imported used jukeboxes, pinball and fruit machines from the United States.[11] The rapid spread of coin machines and variations in local policy prompted the national government in 1964 to develop a special provision for gaming machines to protect the youthful public. Slot machines were banned, but local authorities were authorised to issue permits for other gaming machines. Enterprising businessmen made agreements with local authorities and with owners of pubs where the machines could be placed and with whom they shared the profit. However, local policies continued to vary widely, largely as a result of a rather vague legal definition of 'gaming machine'.

The expansion of machines which paid out in cash led to conflicts between operators, pub owners and local authorities, at times resulting in law suits, until the judiciary decided in 1969 that slot machines were allowed to pay out only in 'free games', not in cash. People soon started to change their free games for money with the operator. The slot-machine business continued to expand rapidly in the early 1970s with the introduction of technically advanced fruit machines, the so-called 'uprights'.

However, the slot-machine industry, and to an even greater extent *kienen* and bingo, lacked strategic political and economic power. In the case of bingo and slot machines, there was no lobby or collective action to speak of until 1971 when a number of producers, dealers and keepers united into the Dutch association for the gaming-machine trade (VAN).[12] Chaos in the slot machines market at the time of the 1974 amendment of the Gaming Act led to a new legal provision for slot machines. While slot machines were tolerated in anticipation of this legal provision, slots paying out in cash were not legalised until 1986. From then on, operators of slot machines were allowed to deploy their apparatus in sports canteens, clubhouses and community centres, in pubs and in amusement arcades, under restrictive and carefully defined conditions.[13]

Casinos

Unlike the slot-machine industry, the protagonists of casinos had useful contacts in politics and were strongly supported by the Netherlands tourist industry. The National Foundation for the Exploitation of Casino Games (later *Holland Casinos*), which opened its first casino in Zandvoort in 1976, is the only licensee for casinos.[14] In 1977, a casino was opened in Valkenburg, which was followed in 1979 by a casino in Scheveningen – all these places are tourist centres (Figure 11.1). The casino licensee was denied a private commercial interest and placed

under the supervision of an independent Casinos Council. Casinos were given this special treatment because Parliament was aware of the special status of this form of gaming. Casinos were considered to be susceptible to fraud and to have other distinguishing features such as 'the opportunity to participate, continuously, from opening time to closing time; the stimulating effect of fellow players and the public, and the urge instantly to win back the lost amount, with the risk of further losses' (Parliament 1971–72: 1). The minimum age for players was set at 18 years and they had to carry identification papers.

After a slow start due to confusion about legal prescriptions and some scandals, since the 1980s considerable effort has been put into improving supervision and professional operation of *Holland Casinos*. An advantage of the late arrival of legal casinos in the Netherlands in comparison with the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany was that the latest international ideas and developments could be implemented.

Changes in the environment gave new direction to casino development in which the number of casinos was extended from three to eight. Although competition from illegal gaming increased, casino gaming became more popular among the population. In addition to tourism, casinos had a local and regional everyday attraction for players. Interest in casinos increased among municipal governments attracted by the impetus a casino could give to revitalisation schemes for run-down city centres and the local economy. New developments took the popular American casino style as a role model rather than the chic European casino style – the corporate style of *Holland Casinos* is best typified as a mix of both. Exploitation of slot machines, and more informal rules of behaviour and dress requirements, which also reflected changes in fashion, were part of this approach. The strategic function of *Holland Casinos* in the fight against illegality also called for lower wagering thresholds and dismantling of the elitist European casino style. However, huge casinos embedded in a wider entertainment industry, like those in the United States, were considered incompatible with Dutch culture.

Illegal gaming and 'Golden Ten'

More than ever, the fight against illegality during the 1980s was an argument for liberalisation. Illegal gaming was a constant problem. Bingo had become increasingly commercial, forms of street gaming appeared in the big cities, slot machines in practice were operated on an illegal basis, and illegal lotteries appeared everywhere. Illegal gaming often took place in private homes, in the back room or in the attic. Illegal casinos also flourished during the 1970s, operated by organised crime and connected with prostitution and the drug trade (Middelburg 1988; van der Roer 1989; van Duyne *et al.* 1990).

At first, illegal gaming houses were intended for private entertainment, similar to gaming in the Chinese community, but gangland racketeers became more and more intrusive. In Rotterdam, the police raided over 100 gaming dens between

1967 and 1982, with a peak in 1981–82, when Rotterdam was a candidate for a legal casino. Here too, an illegal lottery organisation, the 'City Lottery', was dismantled in 1981. Illegal city lotteries, however, were still organised parallel to the weekly lotto draws of the Sports Totalisator. In Amsterdam, the illegal Club 26 burned down in 1983 and police raided the notorious Club Cabala.[15]

Gaming which is on the fringe of legality is a different matter. The law provides that chance should determine the outcome of the game. In theory this seems obvious, but in practice it is difficult to determine. The concept of 'skill' has been used as an argument to bypass the intentions of the law. For example, at the beginning of this century and in the 1930s, there were short-lived experiments with roulette in Scheveningen (Zijlstra 1974). In 1939, use of a 'hoisting machine' was tried by the Supreme Court, which had to decide whether it was a game of skill or a game of chance. From time to time legal debates over games of skill would provide many an entertaining interlude in court.

In the 1960s, another wave of roulette-style games (presented as games of skill) surged over the country. In 1965 the Supreme Court, in a verdict concerning a game called Saturne, transferred the criteria from objective game characteristics to subjective gaming behaviour. In future law suits, the criterion would be based on whether the results of playing the game for the players were seen to be determined by chance or skill. This resulted in practical problems with the onus of proof. Indirectly, this discretion in the application of the law by the judiciary provided a loophole for Golden Ten, a game introduced in the early 1980s. Golden Ten clubs mushroomed, ranging from many small-scale venues to one or two bigger casinos (Schalken 1990). By 1987, a total of about 140 Golden Ten casinos were known to operate. Prosecution soon turned out to be extremely labour-intensive and was not pursued on a large scale until 1990. This was in anticipation of a verdict of the Supreme Court in 1991, which defined Golden Ten as a game of chance and therefore subject to the Gaming Act.

By the 1990s it had become clear that controlling illegal gaming through legal competition alone was not sufficient, and prosecution was intensified. The popularity of illegal gaming could be attributed to lenient, informal and weak state controls, greater time-spatial availability in comparison with legal gaming facilities, and the social and economic opportunities which gaming offered criminals. However, more than criminal involvement, the presence of controversies over illegal gaming signified the increasing subjection of gaming to juridical interpretation. Legal ambiguities, opportunistic policies, low policing priorities, reluctance and discretion in prosecution provided a basis for illegal gaming. Moreover, the illegal exploitation of gaming was considered to be a 'victimless crime', particularly in bingo, slot machines and most prominently in Golden Ten. Vague gaming definitions, juridical interpretation and the problem of illegality marked the transition to legalisation and liberalisation.

POSTMODERN GAMING

It is significant that, despite growing tolerance towards gaming, it remained the object of government regulation and surveillance. Supervision was not slackened; on the contrary, it was intensified, made more comprehensive, improved and differentiated. But government authority was directed towards the supervision of legal facilities and the protection of players rather than the repression of gaming. The repressive task of the state retreated to the fringes of the legal gaming sector.

In the 1980s the general trend towards an autonomus and differentiated gaming sector can be discerned: further expansion and liberalisation of gaming together with improved gaming aesthetics; detailed differentiation in gaming products and detachment of gaming products from specific class-fractions; greater emphasis on market forces, pragmatism and self-regulation; dominance of a fun ethic and playful involvement in gaming. At the same time, there developed a growing recognition of gaming addiction, the scientific study of gaming, increased media involvement and international dependency. The gaming sector became part of a postmodern consumer culture.[16]

Stagflation and pragmatism

As a result of the economic recession in the 1970s, the growth in gaming turnover stagnated, more or less in line with developments in consumer expenditure, while the differentiation of games increased. In the course of the 1980s, turnovers started to rise again, but the structure of the gaming market had changed considerably.

The expansion of gaming during the 1980s is characterised by consolidation as well as by broadening of the types of games, exploitation methods and public participation. The focus was on 'hard', active gaming – on bingo, slot machines, blackjack, roulette and betting shops.[17] It is estimated that the proportion in market shares between passive and active gaming, also defined in terms of short-odds versus long-odds games, shifted from two to one in 1970 to one to one in 1987, with a growing emphasis on active gaming (see Table 11.1) (Driehuis *et al.* 1989).

An ideological change in the Netherlands around 1980 opened the way for more active gaming. The moralism and idealism of the 1950s and 1960s were replaced by pragmatism, not only in politics but also in individual and in group-related lifestyles. These developments occurred in the context of aggravated domestic contradictions, stagnating economic growth (stagflation) and the nation's dependency on the world economy. Structural unemployment worsened, and the tendency towards levelling of incomes came to an end. Adolescents lost the prospect of an uncomplicated, prosperous future. Some pessimistically rejected the social establishment or looked for alternatives in small communities, environmental and peace movements. Others focused on the reinforcement of individual economic wealth (yuppies). Individualistic relationships, small families and associations outside collective social formations dominated social life. The commercial market to an ever greater extent provided for communication and social needs. Social emancipation increased the

public role for women, ethnic minorities and gay people. The range of lifestyle options expanded. In this respect the process of growing differentiation in gaming parallels the broader process of social differentiation.

Leisure, consumption, sports, tourism, art and entertainment became more important in the lifestyles of the Dutch. Pragmatism showed itself in hedonism, ostentatious consumption and in the cultivation of style. This situation provided fertile soil for active gaming. More and more players came from the middle classes with relatively modest lifestyles; and a new generation of *nouveaux riches* no longer scorned such ephemeral pleasures, setting their own standards of play.

In the political realm, ideological oppositions shifted from conservative/progressive towards idealistic/pragmatic, a shift in which pragmatism gained ground. For instance, in 1982–83 debates in Parliament on slot machines paying out in cash and on expanding the number of legal casinos from three to eight were devoid of idealism. The focus was on technical and economic questions and on matters of feasibility and public order. In the case of slot machines, responsible members of the government said:

> Whether or not the government has ethical objections to gambling is not a decisive factor. It is the task of government to provide regulation, based on the consideration that slot machines may not lead to losses that are damaging to the weaker groups in our society, while on the other hand, a reasonable exploitation must be possible, in order to prevent a flight into illegality.
>
> (Parliament 1982–83: 3)

In the cases of slot machines and betting shops unprecedented levels of commercial exploitation were allowed. In 1985, off-track betting shops, to be operated by the multinational corporation Ladbroke, were introduced to meet the needs of trotting and racing. By 1990 Ladbroke operated seventy-five betting shops throughout the country.

It should be noted that the pragmatic evaluation of gaming mentioned here did not remove ideological debates over gaming. Rather, the practice of ideological assessment as well as gaming itself has changed. First, gambling is not a universal and fixed category of play that is acted upon, controlled or enabled; it is shaped and changed in a process of societal transformation of which gaming itself is part and parcel. Changes in the role of gaming in society took place through a change of gaming itself. In particular, the legalisation of gaming was both controlled and controlling, with the introduction of defined and defining gaming standards. In part this redefinition (that is, civilising) of gaming has overcome the ethical objections of former days. Second, the pragmatic emphasis has moved from a moral judgement of gaming itself towards judgement of the way gaming is used. The style of gaming and the social consequences of gaming, as mediated by players and operators, has become the focus of evaluations and indirect interventions. The decisive question is less whether 'to gamble or not to gamble' and more 'how to gamble if to gamble' and 'how to regulate if to legalise'. In this conception the role of the state is to set the prerequisites for 'proper gaming'.

Increasing autonomy and new dependencies

Rapid expansion, professionalisation and liberalisation characterised the development of Dutch gaming in the 1980s. The growing differentiation and autonomy of the gaming sector had several dimensions: growth in numbers, increased time-spatial availability and visibility, the involvement of science and health-care institutions, use of electronic media and a mass market of consumers.

The growth in active gaming accelerated. The number of casino visits increased from 1.1 million in 1982 to 3.2 million in 1990. Casino proceeds increased from 72 million to 400 million guilders. In 1982 the number of slot machines was estimated at 30,000, with an estimated turnover of some 350 million guilders. In 1990, there were 75,000 slot machines outside the casinos, with a turnover of an estimated 1.5 billion guilders. About 10 per cent of the gaming machinery is placed in 130 amusement arcades throughout the Netherlands.

Within a very short period the gaming machine industry had become respectable.[18] This new *élan* assumed a visual, street dimension through the upgrading of amusement arcades. These arcades are no longer out-of-the-way, cramped, murky venues, but spacious, colourful and brightly lit 'pleasure domes' in prime localities. The latest casinos also are urban pleasure sites built around a specific image.

The most recent developments in the early 1990s include the privatisation of the state lottery, which is contracted out in a similar way to casino operations, the extension of sports betting and the instant lottery (SNS), and the presentation of lotteries in spectacular television shows. The only commercial television station in the Netherlands broadcasts Hit Bingo for *de Postcode loterij* every week and *de Staatsloterijshow* once a month. At the same time gaming is taken somewhat less seriously. *Holland Casinos* and the slot-machine trade, for instance, are stressing pleasure and sociability as primary motives for gaming. Players are attracted to gaming venues by the lifestyle, even if they do not take part in gambling. Gaming has, somewhat paradoxically, further departed from its classical definition as a route to fortune in favour of fun and style.

The growing autonomy and independence of the gaming sector has its counterpart in its integration in society, as a tree has roots. Gaming is encountered in more and more social situations, in the first place because more people participate in gaming. In 1986, only 7 per cent of the adult Dutch population had never gambled; 52 per cent sometimes played in the state lottery, 38 per cent participated in a television lottery, 33 per cent played bingo, 15 per cent played on gaming machines and 8 per cent sometimes visited a casino (Becker *et al.* 1987). The gaming sector has become integrated with the social structure of the Netherlands, contributing to the national income, employment and everyday language.

With the increasing popularity of gaming, market growth and increasing competition, gaming operators have become more dependent upon consumers and their diversified preferences. The former reluctance to advertise gaming is waning. Consumers are more informed about gaming opportunities and their

gaming behaviour is supervised to ensure 'proper gaming'. If necessary, their behaviour is corrected, not only to ensure an orderly game but also to prevent excessive gaming and gaming addiction.

Yet gaming remains controversial. In 1986, 62 per cent of the adult population agreed with the statement that 'gambling is wrong and it can get people in trouble'; 92 per cent thought that 'gambling was potentially dangerous' (Becker *et al.* 1987).[19] From this we learn less about the actual dangers of gaming and more about perceived dangers, which has a tempering effect on behaviour. Awareness of dangers is often directly related to self-restraint and self-conscious gaming. Player reflections on gaming can be understood as a further aspect of the sector's autonomy.

Scientific understanding of gaming is a form of detached reflection which enables an understanding and knowledge of gaming, relatively independent of gaming's actual presence. In the 1980s in the Netherlands, research was carried out on practically every aspect of gaming. In many respects, scientific involvement in gaming can be understood as the rational guidance of irrationality, in so far as scientific research influences gaming policies, the industry or public opinon. Indeed, most research in gaming is explicitly designed to improve the industry's sensitivity to the market, to guide political decision making or to control the industry's dark sides – addiction, criminality and illegality. In fact, the gaming industry has introduced methods of scientific management for almost all facets of corporate strategy to deal with players as well as competitors, with the product and regulations, including business ethics. Gaming has become more dependent on scientific research for the establishment of gaming norms, the disciplining of consumers and operators. In this way power and knowledge are intimately related. In this respect it is hardly a coincidence that most research is focused on 'problem players', who are associated with criminality and addiction (Hermkens *et al.* 1988; Kok *et al.* 1991).

With the expansion of the gaming industry in the 1980s, the need for knowledge about the social significance and impact of gaming grew. This research has influenced the debate on gaming and the validity of arguments. Commercial and policy decisions now are based on empirical research and sound theory; experience and common sense no longer suffice. For example, in 1986–87 a major research project was commissioned by the Casinos Council to investigate the Dutch population's opinions on gaming, gaming participation and gaming addiction (Becker *et al.* 1987; Hermkens *et al.* 1988). Variations in gaming participation indicate that relevant factors are age (players on gaming machines are on the whole younger), gender (women generally play bingo, men bet on horse-races) and class (roulette players have higher incomes). However, the various game forms no longer correspond with homogeneous social categories. Instead, specific games are associated with specific groups which display their own identity with respect to gaming. The industry encourages this trend, aiming for a larger playing public via market segmentation and expansion of the range of products.

The relative dissociation from age, gender and class reflects the growing cultural distinctiveness of the gaming sector, in this case with respect to public composition. The range of gaming products has become increasingly independent, through time, space and meaning, of the range of class-fractions.[20] This separation of gaming from class-fractions is only a tendency, not a definite characteristic of gaming. For instance, whereas the casino public is characterised by heterogeneity, the bingo public is characterised by homogeneity. To complicate matters further, this relative independence appears in two forms: differentiation between games, and heterogeneity within games. In the Netherlands, casino gaming is primarily a middle-class phenomenon where individuality and difference are celebrated; bingo is primarily a phenomenon of working-class women, where collective identity is celebrated.[21] Gaming preferences and playing styles mediate between the opportunities offered by the gaming industry on the one side of the market and the lifestyles of consumers on the other side. As a consequence, the socio-economic roots of players, like income, education and gender, are indirectly represented in gaming. They appear not only in participation figures, but more prominently in the way people gamble.

Until 1985 welfare and health organisations in the Netherlands had hardly heard of gaming addiction, but they too have become involved in the gaming sector. Official registration of gambling addicts increased from 400 in 1986 to 2,500 in 1989. The first Gamblers Anonymous group in the Netherlands was formed in 1981; in 1989 there were sixteen. Since 1986, gaming addiction has become manifest and a point of controversy. The latest 'gaming panic' (of the sort cited in the introduction to this chapter) was perhaps more accurately a concern for criminality stemming from addiction, prompting municipal governments to consider banning slot machines. The growing concern over addiction in particular led to controversies over, and sometimes wild speculation about, the estimated number of gaming addicts (estimates ranging between 20,000 and 200,000).

Gaming addiction adds a further dimension to the cultural autonomy of gaming. First, people can more easily be trapped in a subcultural enclave that has become relatively separated from the rest of their daily lives, an enclave that, under certain circumstances – escapism, loss of personal bonds or unemployment – has the potential to become an extreme source of identification and signification, comparable to other cultural sectors like the media, sports and religion. Second, assistance given to addicts by welfare and health-care organisations, through which gaming addicts are resocialised in society, represents a 'soft' form of control and containment of gaming, in addition to the 'hard' control of policing.

Accelerated growth and developments in gaming markets have precipitated several policy innovations to achieve more uniformity and coherence for the gaming sector. In 1989 for instance, the Dutch government reconsidered the fundamental aims of its gaming policy (*Parliament Additionals* 1988–89). The primary objectives remain the regulation of supply and the channelling of demand (in effect, the preservation of state control over gaming). Concerns persisted about the further liberalisation of the market. Another expressed aim

was to strive for greater integration of various legislative provisions and co-operation between regulating bodies and operators. An additional problem was posed by the integration of the European Market in 1992 and the effects on national gaming monopolies.[22] The considerable differences in regulatory standards between the twelve countries of the European Community can be ascribed to a common factor: restrictive national policies in which the banning of foreign competition is an integral part. Developments at both national and international levels compelled Dutch gaming regulators as well as the operators to coordinate and cooperate. During the 1980s, they had expanded towards each other's markets, increasing the danger of market collisions and the danger of creating demand through fierce competition. At the same time, they became dependent on each other's support to face possible foreign competition. With these initiatives, the degree of autonomous self-management within the gaming sector increased.

INSTANT PLEASURE

Over time, an autonomous gaming sector has emerged in the Netherlands with its own regimen of regulation. Each consecutive phase in this development has been presented as congruous with the preceding one, rather than a clean break with the past. The restrictive phase which took shape at the end of the nineteenth century, in which gaming was condemned as a moral evil, can be understood both as the submission of all gaming to state control, and as the isolation of gaming in the cultural sphere of social life. This submission and cultural definition of gaming was not abandoned in the following permissive phase. Rather, state control was applied in a different way, and the cultural definition of gaming was changed. Following market pressures, government authority was used to achieve the controlled legalisation of gaming. In this process, legal possibilities in the gaming sector were extended, and the number of games and the variations in games increased. During the 1980s, the development into a postmodern gaming culture in the short run signalled rupture with the moral reserve of the past. But more importantly, it sped up the long-term process of gaming's cultural separation and independence, with increasing liberalisation and a precise, detailed and differentiated basis for gaming in society.

The development of cultural autonomy in the gaming sector has been underscored by changes in the connections between gaming and public causes. Early lotteries were especially designed for the purpose of alleviating social and economic needs. Gaming served as a means to a public end. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the lottery had become an end in itself, whereby charity and welfare were regarded as a means to curb the passion for gaming. The state lottery saw a similar development. It served initially as a means of replenishing the Treasury, but by the middle of the nineteenth century the importance of the state lottery as an income source for government had already diminished considerably. By the early twentieth century the state lottery was only

sustained in order to provide the people with an outlet for their propensity to gamble. With growing liberalisation, the connection to public causes continued to be a crucial aspect in the regulation of gaming. Betting on horse-races and on football games remains immediately and explicitly linked to specific social interests. In lotto, this connection is less immediate. In casinos and the slot-machine industry, the games are virtually independent of motives and legitimations other than gaming-related ones. In these cases the connections with societal interests (prestige, tourism, taxes) are indirect.[23] Some gaming proceeds, such as those from the General Dutch Lottery and Sports Totalisator, are put into a mutual fund from which various non-profit organisations receive a share. Proceeds of the state lottery and *Holland Casinos* go to general government funds, so that public welfare is perceived in a general, abstracted sense.

The tendency of disconnecting gaming from external social and economic ends can also be seen in the changing justifications given for legalisation from the inherent human propensity to gamble, to the financing of social and cultural institutions and the fighting against illegality – all versions of gaming as a 'necessary evil' – to a positive evaluation of gaming as entertainment and gaming, an integral and legitimate element in the economy of pleasure. All of these arguments have figured in debates on gaming in every historical period, but they have assumed varying degrees of importance and different implications. The Gaming Act of 1964, for example, was basically a moral act and liberalisation was a consequence of concessions to market forces. The 1974 amendment was a defeat for moralism, accelerating liberalisation and the cultural acceptance of gaming. Further liberalisation in the 1980s reflected commercial appreciation of the industry. In this case, reservations about gaming had mostly to do with matters of public order.

The tendency towards commercialisation represents only one dimension in the general trend to the cultural autonomy of gaming. Others concern the increasing differentiation of gaming products, the shift towards a fun-ethic in gaming, an emphasis on self-regulation and pragmatism, the move towards more distanced and indirect modes of regulation, professionalisation, the involvement of science and health institutions, improved gaming aesthetics and the involvement of a diversified mass of consumers. Participation by social groups ranges across the full spectrum of gaming options, which are provided on an increasingly omnipresent and continual basis.

All of these trends point in the direction of a separate and relatively independent cultural sector. This is not to say that the autonomy of gaming has reached a final stage, or even that it is irreversible: far from it. In comparison with other cultural sectors, such as fashion, sports or music, the degree of cultural autonomy in gaming is relatively low. Furthermore, within the gaming sector, degrees of autonomy vary considerably for different games, as they do across nations. Autonomy can be won or lost in social struggles between contradictory interests.

Explanations for changes in the makeup of Dutch gaming at each phase of development can be found in the political, economic and socio-cultural

circumstances of the time. The cultural separation and control of gaming is related to the rise of industrial capitalism and the intervention of the nation state in the daily lives of the people. Liberalisation can be attributed to rising material living standards, pressures from the illegal gaming market, shifts in the power basis of party ideologies, the general socio-cultural acceptance of gaming and, paradoxically, the state's containment and tempering of gaming itself.

From a political culture perspective, the subjection of gaming in the Netherlands to state control and the simultaneous definition of gaming standards was a process of controlled legalisation, in which gaming itself was changed. The state was able to legalise and liberalise gaming precisely because of its firm control over gaming: the liberalisation of gaming presupposed a stronger state, not a weaker one. The liberalisation of gaming has been realised through the introduction of safeguards within the gaming sector, with prescribed gaming standards and expectations of self-control from operators, players, regulators and even from the judiciary (Wouters 1990). Theft, foul play, fraud, undesirable stimulation of demand and excessive gaming are controlled from the inside of the gaming sector and in advance rather than from the outside and retrospectively. In the process, the boundaries between legal and illegal gaming have been sharply redefined. But also, as a result of prosperity and social security, players no longer immediately risk their livelihoods in gaming. For players and operators, the emphasis has shifted from what was negatively called gambling towards what is positively regarded as leisure and entertainment.

The role of the state – in which the cultural independence of gaming can be seen both as the expression of state control and as a constitutive part of state formation itself – cannot be understood irrespective of class emancipation and the commercialisation of culture. In the field of political representation, class emancipation has led to more equal power balances, resulting in policy compromises over class-bound gaming ideologies. Of equal importance, because most modern ideologies, with the exception of the liberal standpoint, were opposed to gambling, was the cultural and economic emancipation of a wide range of social classes. This has led to the development of an affluent mass of consumers and pressures from the market to legalise gaming. It did not lead, however, to a homogeneous mass culture of gaming. On the contrary, the growth of the gaming market was realised with and through difference.

In the period of the welfare state, gaming was considered to be primarily of interest to finance cultural and welfare institutions. In the most recent phase a new layer has been added: gaming itself is shaped as a consumer product in the economy of pleasure. First, gaming can be regarded as a cultivation of money, at a time when people are judged more than ever according to their spending power and depend greatly on commerce for the creation of lifestyles. Second, gaming represents more than money fetishism. It has to be regarded as far more than a mirror of society; it is a substantial, increasingly autonomous part of society. The forms in which the gaming boom has taken shape are indicative of the way in which today's consumer culture operates: active consumer participation in the

turnover of money, pleasure and style as the principal sources of meaning and motivation, and the spread of commercial entertainment over all social strata. Postmodern consumption patterns can be regarded as part of the answer to a crisis of capitalism, the stagnation of economic growth in the 1970s (Harvey 1989). Gaming perfectly meets the standards of postmodern consumption. It is a trade in illusions. Money is almost instantly turned into fun, identity, status, hope (and profit to the operators). The most recent developments in gaming in the Netherlands – casino games, slot machines, lottery draws in spectacular television shows and the instant lottery – also meet most closely the time-space compression as required by capital.[24]

This is not to suggest that the political culture of gaming is implicitly designed to meet the economic requirements of a particular era. Politics, economics and culture, the separation of which is a consequence of modernity itself, are intimately connected. Instead of searching for or inferring causalities, it is of greater relevance to see how these separations and connections are actually realised and contested in practice.

NOTES

1 This chapter is based upon research endowed by the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO). Translation of this chapter has been sponsored by the Casinos Council.

2 Fokker was a liberal politician who published a book on the history of the Netherlands state lottery (Fokker 1864).

3 The theoretical frameworks I have in mind here include: for processes of state formation, the work of Elias (1978, 1982); for economic formation, the work of Harvey (1989); and for social classes, the work of Bourdieu (1984).

4 KNVB: Koninklijke Nederlands Voetbalbond (Royal Netherlands Soccer League).

5 The triple system of pillarisation, a formal and informal vertical segmentation of key interest groups, is considered to be characteristic of Dutch societal relations in the 1950s. Another aspect was the necessity for these groups to cooperate politically to address an economy which had suffered from the war and the loss of Dutch colonies, and which lagged behind internationally.

6 SNS: Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator (Foundation National Sports Totalisator).

7 CDA: Christen Democratisch Appel (Christian Democratic Appeal).

8 Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion, press releases nos. 288, 1034, 1456.

9 The SUFA (Foundation Executing Fund-raising) is a merger of some private charitable organisations which held a yearly lottery from 1961 onwards. In 1970, these institutions founded the ALN (General Dutch Lotteries) which initiated a giro lottery and, in 1978, a bank lottery.

10 From a Weberian perspective, the emergence of distinctive, autonomous spheres of social action can be regarded as the key momentum in modernisation processes. In his analysis of social development, Weber put as foremost the development of independent spheres (*lebensordnungen*) of economics, politics, aesthetics, science or religion, each domain with a dynamic of its own (cf. Lasch 1990). In Simmel's sociology of culture, this 'autonomisation' appears as the commodification of culture, with particular emphasis on the role of money (Simmel 1907). In Elias and Dunning's sociology of leisure (1986), various leisure practices are understood as temporal-

spatial 'enclaves', each with its own structure of meaning. Bourdieu's cultural theory (1984) focuses on the notion of 'fields', but hardly considers the historical construction of such fields. I prefer to use the term 'sector' to indicate a specific set of consumption practices together with a guiding regime of regulation, such as gaming. Indeed, the relative autonomy of various leisure practices is not given, but is historically produced and reproduced, and is contested at all times and places (Kalb and Kingma 1991).

11 In a similar manner, some old slot machines nowadays find their way to Eastern European countries.

12 VAN: Vereniging Automatenhandel Nederland (Netherlands Association Gaming Machinery Trade).

13 Prescriptions include: a minimum age for players of 16 years, a limit on the number of machines on the premises (usually two machines are allowed), a maximum stake of 25 cents per game, a minimum duration of 3 seconds per game and a maximum loss of 50 guilders per hour on average.

14 The Foundation was later renamed *Holland Casinos*.

15 It was reported that the American Mafia was involved in both these clubs.

16 The debate on postmodernism can be found in Harvey (1989), Lasch (1990), Featherstone (1991) and Giddens (1991).

17 'Active' gaming is distinguished both from passive playing – *alea iacta est*, in which players can hardly influence the nature of the game, as in lotteries – and from interactive gaming – *ludere alea*, where players not only play the game, but the game also reacts upon the players, as in a poker game (Eco 1990).

18 This change is reflected in the title of the gaming machinery trade policy plan for the 1990s, 'Towards a respectable branch'; in 1987 it was called 'Unknown – unloved'.

19 These high percentages may have been influenced by the terms used in the questions. In the Netherlands, the term 'gambling' carries connotations of improper and risky gaming.

20 The relative independence of the field of cultural products on one hand, and the range of social categories on the other, are central to Bourdieu's theory of cultural distinction (Bourdieu 1984, 1988). From this perspective, postmodernism should not be equated with a process of 'de-differentiation', but rather as a process in which differentiations and the simultaneous harmonisation of differences – in the sphere of products *and* the sphere of lifestyles – occur increasingly independently of each other. This aspect of cultural autonomy intensifies a quest for identity, both on the supply side of the market, in the gaming industry, and on the demand side of the market, in the lifestyles of the players.

21 With respect to class cultures in gaming, in the Netherlands only bingo has been the subject of research (Kingma 1988, 1991).

22 The European Committee ordered an inventory of national markets (European Committee 1991).

23 In this respect it is remarkable that the link between bingo and local cultural institutions has been retained, despite pressure from the market to disconnect them.

24 According to Harvey, 'flexible accumulation' would lead to a new phase of growth, through 'time-space compression': accelerating turnover time of capital. This requires, among other things, greater flexibility of the 'mode of consumption' – not more of the same products, but other articles, adaptations of existing products, changes in the organisation of sales, in consumption habits, in such a way that bigger and faster turnovers are realised, with bigger profits. Fast-food products, cash-and-carry, low-fat, low-sugar and low-alcohol products and disposables are examples of this. Because they can be virtually consumed without limits, 'immaterial' products, such as articles in the illusory culture of art, literature, music or sports, are admirably suited.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Becker, H. A., Hermkens, P. L. J. and Mutsaers, H. P. M. (1987) 'Deelname aan kansspelen. Waardering voor kansspelen', *Report*, Universiteit Utrecht.

Bourdieu, P. (1984) *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, London and New York: Routledge.

—— (1988) 'Program for a sociology of sport', *Sociology of Sport Journal* 5: 153–61.

Dickens, C. (ed.) (1858) 'Down among the Dutchmen, vi', *Household Words. A Weekly Journal*: 156–60.

Driehuis, W., Bunt, J., van Empel, M. and van der Pligt, J. (1989) 'De nederlandse kansspelmarkt: feiten, kansen en bedreigingen', *Report*, Amsterdam.

van Duyne, P. C., Kouwenberg, R. F. and Romeijn, G. (1990) *Misdaadondernemingen. Ondernemende misdadigers*, Arnhem: Gouda Quint.

Eco, U. (1990) 'Huizinga en het spel', *Wat spiegels betreft*, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker: 285–303.

Economische Statistische Berichten (1982) 'Themanummer kansspelen': 1351–78.

Elias, N. (1978) *The Civilizing Process*, vol. I, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

—— (1982) *The Civilizing Process*, vol. II, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elias, N. and Dunning, E. (1986) *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

European Committee (1991) 'Gambling in the single market', *Report*, Brussels.

Featherstone, M. (1991) *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*, London: Sage.

Fokker, G. A. (1862) *Geschiedenis der loterijen in de Nederlanden*, Amsterdam: Frederik Muller.

—— (1864) *De Nederlandsche Staatsloterij*, Middelburg.

Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-identity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hermkens, P. L. J., Becker, H. A., Kok, K. M. and Mutsaers, H. P. M. (1988) 'Kansspelen als riskante gewoonte', *Report*, Universiteit Utrecht.

Holthoon, F. L. (ed.) (1985) *De Nederlandse samenleving sinds 1815*, Assen: Van Gorcum.

Kalb, D. and Kingma, S. (eds) (1991) *Fragmenten van vermaak. Macht en plezier in moderniserend Nederland*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Kapteyn, P. (1980) *Taboe, ontwikkelingen in macht en moraal speciaal in Nederland*, Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers.

Kingma, S. (1988) 'Bingo en kienen. Over de structurering van eigentijds vermaak', *Volkscultuur*: 40–52.

—— (1991) 'De legitimiteit van het kienen en bingo of de smaak van de noodzaak', in D. Kalb and S. Kingma (eds) *Fragmenten van vermaak. Macht en plezier in moderniserend Nederland*, Amsterdam: Rodopi: 123–51.

Kok, I., Hermkens, P. L. J., van Wijngaarden, J. J. and van de Wijngaart, G. F. (1991) 'Determinanten probleemspelers', *Report*, Utrecht: VAN.

Lasch, S. (1990) *Sociology of Postmodernism*, London: Routledge.

Middelburg, B. (1988) *De Mafia in Amsterdam*, Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers.

Nederlandse Staatswetten nr. 69 (1964, bewerking H.D. Pijpers), Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink.

—— (1988, bewerking F.J. Gallast), Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink.

Parliament (1971–72) *Preliminary Report*, Bill no. 11.549: 1.

—— (1982–83) *Memorandum in Reply*, Bill no. 16.481, no. 10: 3.

Parliament Additionals 11 (1988–89) 21.277, no. 2.

van Poelje, G. A. *et al.* (1962) *Nederlands bestuursrecht deel II*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Samson.

van der Roer, R. (1989) 'De miljoenengok van Ger van D.V.', in C. J. C. F. Fijnaut, *Georganiseerde misdaad en strafrechtelijk politiebeleid*, Lochem: van den Brink: 49–80.

Schalken, T. M. (1990) *Casino en illegaliteit*, Arnhem: Gouda Quint.
Schama, S. (1987) *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age*, New York: Knopf.
Simmel, G. (1907) *Philosophie des Geldes*, Munich and Leipzig: Von Duncken & Humbolt.
Stuurman, S. (1983) *Verzuiling, kapitalisme en patriarchaat*, Nijmegen: SUN.
de Swaan, A. (1988) *In Care of the State: Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Therborn, G. (1989) '"Pillarisation" and popular networks. Two variants of welfare state capitalism: the Netherlands and Sweden', in F. G. Castles (ed.) *The Comparative History of Public Policy*, London: Polity Press: 192–241.
Wouters, C. (1990) *Van minnen en sterven. Informalisering van omgangsvormen rond seks en dood*, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
Zijlstra, A. A. (1974) *Vaar Wel, Scheveningen! Bonte herinneringen aan een badplaats*, Leiden.

12

THE MEDICALISATION OF GAMBLING AS AN 'ADDICTION'

Michael Walker

Gambling is a common leisure activity in most countries and cultures throughout the world. However, it also attracts criticism and censure in most societies. Much of this criticism is directed at the fact that some gamblers continue with the activity to such an extent that it disrupts their lives, their families and their employment. Within western cultures, useful employment, family life and the acquisition of material wealth are central goals of the socialisation process. The heavy gambler is seen as a failure by these standards. One explanation for this failure is that the socialisation of the individual has been inadequate: the society has failed in its task. However, increasingly, a different kind of explanation is given: that the heavy gambler is ill. Heavy gambling is not only socially deviant but it is caused by a disease process in the individual. In particular, western societies are moving quickly to a recognition of heavy gambling as an addiction. At the same time there is a concerted attempt to change the concept of addiction itself. These two forces, one to classify heavy gambling as an addiction and the second to broaden 'addiction' to include heavy gambling, are converging on a view of heavy gambling as a pathological state of the individual.

In this chapter, it is argued that this view relies upon a strictly limited interpretation of the evidence. It is claimed that the view that heavy gambling is pathological is recent in origin and changing in character, that a pathology of gambling as an addiction has not been demonstrated, and that the similarities between drug addiction and heavy gambling are overstated. The movement to medicalise gambling as an addiction is not based on sound empirical evidence. Thus the inadequate metaphor of gambling as compulsive is replaced by another inadequate metaphor of gambling as addictive. What is required is a new, non-medical metaphor.

THE MOVE TO VIEW HEAVY GAMBLING AS PATHOLOGICAL

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, gambling was viewed as a vice and heavy gambling as a sin. The change from 'gambling as sin' to